Figure 23 Oct 2026From “Subsidizing one platform side can be a network design decision”

The platform-side subsidy decision card

Keep side, expected response, burden, horizon, and stop signal in one reviewable object.

Figure 2The platform-side subsidy decision card

Field	Subsidised side	Other side	Evidence before continuation
Side and role	A declared participant group receives lower price or support	A declared participant group whose value or participation should respond	The roles are not only labels; the interaction is stated
Price or support baseline	Fee waiver, discount vs list/cost, or support resource is declared relative to baseline	Price and access conditions remain visible	The allocation baseline (cost vs fee) is separated from the outcome
Cross-side response	Expected response is written as a mechanism (or avoided loss vs counterfactual)	Response unit, lag threshold, and review window are declared	A comparison can identify the response, threshold lag, or its absence
Useful outcome	The side's participation is observed separately	Interaction, transaction, or complement quality is observed	Participation is not used as a substitute for usefulness
Burden	Margin, capacity, service, moderation, or risk burden is recorded	Any burden shifted to the other side is visible	The cost boundary is stated
Governance and Decision	Continue, extend, re-price, or exit is assigned to a named owner	The other side's evidence and system-of-record trail are included	The stop, extend, or redesign condition is dated and reviewable

Swipe or scroll horizontally if the table is wider than your screen.

Source: Author's framework; core variables grounded in Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015); test and governance structure author's. All rows and signals are synthetic; no platform data is shown.

PNG4:3, 1600 × 1200, with the title, the source line and the attribution set in the image isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03.png

Source and evidence

Each line names a claim related to this exhibit, its source, and how it was checked.

A PVA05-C1 The formal model explains how firms can profitably give away information products by using two-sided network externalities: "a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity"Parker & Van Alstyne. (2005)
A PVA05-C2 Platform pricing and product design must account for cross-side network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation, showing "which half of a two-sided network market to discount"Parker & Van Alstyne. (2005)
A RT03-C1 The model describes platform competition in markets with network externalities where platforms "must choose a price structure and not only a price level"Rochet & Tirole. (2003)
A BJ15-C2 In the reported setting, "complementor development responds to platform growth", but attracting complementors has a net-zero effect on ongoing developmentBoudreau & Jeppesen. (2015)
B P01-OWN-C1 A side-allocation decision card should record each side, price or subsidy, expected cross-side response, burden, horizon, comparison, and decision owner.Author synthesis based on Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2003).
B P01-OWN-C3 A subsidy review should separate participation, useful cross-side transactions, complement quality, cost burden, and continuation or exit evidence.Author synthesis based on Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015).
B P01-OWN-C4 The author card distinguishes continuation, bounded extension, re-pricing, exit, and pause or redesign: a defensive response needs an avoided-loss counterfactual; extension needs a predeclared lag or threshold, a dated second horizon and burden within bounds; a confounded comparison prompts pause or redesign before further commitment.Author decision rule; the cited studies do not set this threshold.

Grades: A, verified against the printed page of the primary source · B, primary source, text layer only · C, authoritative secondary · D, reported.

From the essay

Pricing & revenue architecture

Subsidizing one platform side can be a network design decision

A lower price can attract participation without creating useful network value. Name the side, response, burden, horizon, and stop rule before continuing.

3 Oct 2026

Read the essay

This exhibit belongs to an essay: the numbers live here, the argument lives there.

Cite or embed

APA 7

Isoglu, S. (2026). The platform-side subsidy decision card [Figure]. isoglu.com. https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03/

BibTeX

@misc{isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03,
  author = {Isoglu, Sinan},
  title = {{The platform-side subsidy decision card}},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {Figure 2, isoglu.com},
  url = {https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03/},
  note = {From the essay {Subsidizing one platform side can be a network design decision}}
}

Embed this exhibit

Copy this HTML to use the PNG exhibit on your site with its source line and a link back to the exhibit page.

<figure>
  <a href="https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03/">
    <img src="https://isoglu.com/social/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03.png" alt="Figure 2: The platform-side subsidy decision card" width="3200" height="2400">
  </a>
  <figcaption>Figure 2: The platform-side subsidy decision card. Source: Author&#39;s framework; core variables grounded in Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015); test and governance structure author&#39;s. All rows and signals are synthetic; no platform data is shown. <a href="https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig03/">View exhibit</a>.</figcaption>
</figure>