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Figure 1From “Subsidizing one platform side can be a network design decision”

Participation is not the same as useful network value

Two-sided pricing theory explains allocation conditions. A bounded 85-platform study limits what participation can show.

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Figure 1Participation is not the same as useful network value

Participation is not the same as useful network value A two-row evidence map. Two-sided pricing theory explains cross-side pricing conditions; a bounded study of 85 online multiplayer game platforms with unpaid complementors does not establish current marketplace effects. CLAIMEVIDENCEBOUNDARYSide-specific prices depend oncross-side conditions.The model links each side's price toits effect on the other side.It does not identify the best subsidyfor a named platform.Participation alone does not showuseful network value.Across 85 online multiplayer gameplatforms with unpaid complementors,attracting them had a net-zero effecton ongoing development and did notstimulate network effects.The unpaid hobbyist setting does notestablish effects for paid suppliers,current marketplaces, or everyplatform.

Source: Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), theoretical model; Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015), study of 85 online multiplayer game platforms with unpaid complementors. Interpretation and transfer limits are the author's synthesis.

PNG4:3, 1600 × 1200, with the title, the source line and the attribution set in the image isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02.png

Source and evidence

Each line names a claim related to this exhibit, its source, and how it was checked.

  • A PVA05-C1 The formal model explains how firms can profitably give away information products by using two-sided network externalities: "a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity"Parker & Van Alstyne. (2005)
  • A PVA05-C2 Platform pricing and product design must account for cross-side network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation, showing "which half of a two-sided network market to discount"Parker & Van Alstyne. (2005)
  • A BJ15-C1 The study analyzes "85 online multi-player game platforms with unpaid complementors" whose complementors are motivated outside a conventional sales-incentive systemBoudreau & Jeppesen. (2015)
  • A BJ15-C2 In the reported setting, "complementor development responds to platform growth", but attracting complementors has a net-zero effect on ongoing developmentBoudreau & Jeppesen. (2015)
  • B P01-OWN-C2 A lower price is an experiment or allocation choice, not evidence of a useful network effect by itself.Author boundary based on Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015).
  • B P01-OWN-C3 A subsidy review should separate participation, useful cross-side transactions, complement quality, cost burden, and continuation or exit evidence.Author synthesis based on Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015).

Grades: A, verified against the printed page of the primary source · B, primary source, text layer only · C, authoritative secondary · D, reported.

From the essay

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APA 7

Isoglu, S. (2026). Participation is not the same as useful network value [Figure]. isoglu.com. https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02/

BibTeX
@misc{isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02,
  author = {Isoglu, Sinan},
  title = {{Participation is not the same as useful network value}},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {Figure 1, isoglu.com},
  url = {https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02/},
  note = {From the essay {Subsidizing one platform side can be a network design decision}}
}
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  <a href="https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02/">
    <img src="https://isoglu.com/social/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02.png" alt="Figure 1: Participation is not the same as useful network value" width="3200" height="2400">
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  <figcaption>Figure 1: Participation is not the same as useful network value. Source: Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), theoretical model; Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015), study of 85 online multiplayer game platforms with unpaid complementors. Interpretation and transfer limits are the author&#39;s synthesis. <a href="https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-subsidizing-one-platform-side-is-a-network-design-decision-fig02/">View exhibit</a>.</figcaption>
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