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Table 1From “A marketplace is both referee and competitor”

Two bounded marketplace governance packages

A platform's role, governance mechanism, structural condition, and measured outcome should travel together.

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Table 1Two bounded marketplace governance packages

Governance recordStructural conditionReported readingWhat it does not prove
Monitoring plus platform investmentInfrastructure supports the rule and the platform observes participant conductThe monitoring-performance association is strengthened in the Sen et al. studyIt does not prove higher platform profit or a causal effect in every market
Procedural fairness plus self-participationThe platform participates and must make its process credible to affected partiesThe fairness-performance association is strengthened in the Sen et al. studyIt does not erase the platform's incentive conflict or prove neutrality
Role and data ledgerThe platform is rule-maker, intermediary, participant, and data holder where applicableThe organization can state who sees what and who decidesDisclosure does not prove fair use or improved performance
Outcome ledgerSeller performance, buyer experience, participant access, and platform economics remain separateThe evidence can be matched to the decision it informsOne outcome cannot stand in for the others

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Source: Sen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta (2023), Rösch (2024), and Homburg, Vomberg & Muehlhaeuser (2020). The packages and ledger fields are the author's synthesis; the table does not promise platform or seller financial performance.

PNG4:3, 1600 × 1200, with the title, the source line and the attribution set in the image isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01.png

Source and evidence

Each line names a claim related to this exhibit, its source, and how it was checked.

  • B SKDG23-C1 A two-sided B2B electronic market is a triadic system with a platform firm coordinating buyer and seller participantsSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C2 In the reported model, platform monitoring and procedural fairness are positively associated with buyer-perceived seller performanceSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C3 Platform self-participation weakens the positive monitoring-performance association and strengthens the positive procedural-fairness-performance associationSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C4 Platform investments strengthen the positive monitoring-performance association and weaken the positive procedural-fairness-performance associationSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C5 The two-wave study retains 184 usable buyer-side responses covering 82 unique platforms after its screening and missing-data stepsSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C6 The study measures seller performance from the buyer's perspective as delivered to buyers, not as platform financial performanceSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C7 The paper presents two process-structure packages: self-participation with fairness, and platform investments with monitoringSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B SKDG23-C8 The survey design and buyer-perceived outcome bound the findings and do not establish a universal causal effect for every marketplaceSen, Kumar, Dubey & Gupta. (2023)
  • B MRC27-C1 A marketplace governance review should record the platform as rule-maker, participant, and data holder wherever those roles overlapAuthor framework grounded in Rösch (2024) and Sen et al. (2023)
  • B MRC27-C2 Monitoring, procedural fairness, platform investment, and self-participation are distinct governance fieldsAuthor framework grounded in Sen et al. (2023)
  • B MRC27-C3 A control package is a testable governance choice, not a universal recommendationAuthor framework grounded in Sen et al. (2023) and Homburg et al. (2020)
  • B MRC27-C4 Seller performance, buyer experience, platform economics, and participant access are separate outcomesAuthor framework grounded in Sen et al. (2023), Rösch (2024), and Homburg et al. (2020)
  • B MRC27-C5 A platform's dual role requires disclosure of incentive conflicts and the evidence boundary behind any performance claimAuthor framework grounded in Rösch (2024)

Grades: A, verified against the printed page of the primary source · B, primary source, text layer only · C, authoritative secondary · D, reported.

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APA 7

Isoglu, S. (2026). Two bounded marketplace governance packages [Table]. isoglu.com. https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01/

BibTeX
@misc{isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01,
  author = {Isoglu, Sinan},
  title = {{Two bounded marketplace governance packages}},
  year = {2026},
  howpublished = {Table 1, isoglu.com},
  url = {https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01/},
  note = {From the essay {A marketplace is both referee and competitor}}
}
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<figure>
  <a href="https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01/">
    <img src="https://isoglu.com/social/isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01.png" alt="Table 1: Two bounded marketplace governance packages" width="3200" height="2400">
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  <figcaption>Table 1: Two bounded marketplace governance packages. Source: Sen, Kumar, Dubey &amp; Gupta (2023), Rösch (2024), and Homburg, Vomberg &amp; Muehlhaeuser (2020). The packages and ledger fields are the author&#39;s synthesis; the table does not promise platform or seller financial performance. <a href="https://isoglu.com/insights/exhibits/isoglu-2026-a-marketplace-is-both-referee-and-competitor-fig01/">View exhibit</a>.</figcaption>
</figure>