Revenue operations & AI

BANT vs MEDDIC: a qualification checklist is a hypothesis

BANT checks budget, authority, need and timing; MEDDIC maps how a buying group decides. In a 1988 field test, tight leads converted better and sold less.

Author
Sinan Isoglu, MBA (Quantic)
Commercial growth leader, lecturer and doctoral researcher

Published
30 October 2026
Updated
8 November 2026
Reading time
21 min

Management summary

BANT and MEDDIC are two sales qualification checklists known by their acronyms. BANT asks whether a lead has budget, authority, need and timing; MEDDIC asks for the metrics, economic buyer, decision criteria, decision process, pain and champion behind a deal. This essay defines both, gives the author's view of which fits which sale, and reads eight peer-reviewed studies. A 1988 field test found that tightly qualified leads converted far better and still produced fewer sales than loose ones; a 2011 scorecard, partly built from BANT-like items, separated buyers from non-buyers in the sample its cutoff was fitted to, but on this essay's arithmetic would have rejected about a third of eventual bookings. No study tests BANT or MEDDIC by name, and the two tests come from one firm each. It ends with the author's untested proposal for testing a rule on a team's own CRM data.

Contents

§ 1 What are BANT and MEDDIC? 3
Figure 1 What are BANT and MEDDIC? 4
§ 2 Where does the research meet each letter? 5
Figure 2 BANT and MEDDIC letters against what the studies observed 6
§ 3 How tightly should a team qualify its leads? 9
Figure 3 Tight and loose lead qualification in a 1988 field test 10
Figure 4 Conversion rate against sales in tight and loose lead qualification, 1988 11
§ 4 Does a scorecard with BANT-like items predict which leads close? 12
Figure 5 What a lead scorecard cutoff passed and rejected, in sample 13
§ 5 Does the sales context decide which checklist fits? 13
§ 6 Why do complex deals end without any decision? 14

© 2026 Sinan Isoglu · isoglu.com/insights/journal/bant-vs-meddic/

§ 7 Who has to believe the checklist for it to work? 15
§ 8 Does walking away from weak deals early pay off? 16
§ 9 What did buyers say about budget when a proposal failed? 16
§ 10 What can neither BANT nor MEDDIC tell a revenue team? 17
§ 11 How can a team test its own qualification rule? 17
Figure 6 How can a team test its own qualification rule? 18
Figure 7 A qualification rule test record for BANT or MEDDIC 19
§ 12 So which framework should a team adopt? 20
References 21

What are BANT and MEDDIC?

§ 1 of 12

A seller calls a deal qualified in the pipeline review, and the useful question is: qualified by which rule? BANT and MEDDIC are two answers known by their acronyms. BANT asks four questions of a lead: budget, authority, need and timing. MEDDIC asks six of a deal: metrics, economic buyer, decision criteria, decision process, identify pain and champion. The letters below are each framework's own content, as the acronyms are commonly spelled out. They are not evidence that either framework works, and none of the eight studies this essay draws on names either one.

BANT, letter by letter:

1. **Budget**: is money available for a purchase of this kind?
2. **Authority**: can this contact decide, or reach the person who does?
3. **Need**: does the buyer have a problem the offer addresses?
4. **Timing**: will a decision fall within a period the seller can plan for?

MEDDIC, letter by letter:

1. **Metrics**: the measurable result the buyer expects from the purchase.
2. **Economic buyer**: the person who can release the money.
3. **Decision criteria**: what the buyer will judge the options against.
4. **Decision process**: the steps, people and approvals between interest and signature.
5. **Identify pain**: the problem that makes acting worth the cost.
6. **Champion**: a person inside the buyer who argues for the purchase.

Which should a team use? On this essay's reading, BANT fits a single lead whose contact can buy soon, MEDDIC fits a deal that a buying group decides over months, and either one is a rule to test against your own won, lost and no-decision records. The last clause matters because no study below tests either framework. The two that come closest point the same way without testing a checklist: in a 1988 field test, a mailer that drew tightly qualified leads converted far better and still produced fewer sales, and in a 2011 scorecard test, on this essay's arithmetic, the cutoff raised the booking rate of the leads it passed while rejecting about a third of eventual bookings, in the sample it was fitted to.


BANT's questions appear, without the acronym, in the oldest of this essay's sources. Jolson (1988)[4] reports that, "Based on the judgment

or intuition of the salespeople, qualified prospects are people or organizations with needs or desires that can be satisfied by the seller's products or services", who also "must exhibit a willingness or readiness to buy or at least a willingness to be exposed to the seller's offer". A third dimension, the ability to buy, "consists of authority to buy and buying power in the form of cash or credit", though he calls it "often dwarfed by the other two" and adds that not all highly qualified prospects show desire, receptiveness and buying power at once. Need, readiness, authority and budget are all there, but not as a test every lead must pass. This essay does not claim that BANT came from that paper.

4 Jolson, M. A. (1988). Qualifying sales leads: The tight and loose approaches. Industrial Marketing Management, 17(3), 189–196.

Figure 1 sets the two side by side on the basis the rest of this essay uses: who each checklist is about, what it asks, and what neither can observe from the seller's side. The arrangement is this essay's, and the three blind spots are argued in the sections below.

Figure 1 What are BANT and MEDDIC?



Source Diagram from this essay. Sources and interpretation are given in the article.

Where does the research meet each letter?

§ 2 of 12

Figure 2 sets each letter beside the closest thing the studies observed, and adds two rows for a qualification rule as a whole. The mapping is this essay's. No study was designed around either framework, and only the last two rows come from tests against sales outcomes; neither of those tests a checklist.

Figure 2 BANT and MEDDIC letters against what the studies observed

Every BANT and MEDDIC letter has a neighbour in the research, matched by this essay; the two tests against outcomes judge a rule as a whole, each in one firm.

Letter or rule	What the framework asks	Closest thing a study observed	Kind of evidence
BANT: Budget	Is money available?	Buying power is part of the ability to buy (Jolson, 1988); in 35 failed proposals, all funded and awarded to another seller, buyers weighed cost against benefit (Friend et al., 2014)	Definition; buyer interviews, 35 failed cases, all with budget
BANT: Authority	Can this contact decide?	Authority to buy is the other part of the ability to buy (Jolson, 1988); inbound qualifiers check that the contact is the right person for a sales conversation (Terho et al., 2023)	Definition; interviews, 13 people in 8 firms
BANT: Need	Is there a problem the offer solves?	A category joining a predefined need to a lowest-price search was lost or canceled more often than value-adding relationships (Virtanen et al., 2015)	One company's CRM, 4,194 leads

Letter or rule	What the framework asks	Closest thing a study observed	Kind of evidence
BANT: Timing	Will a decision come soon?	One co-founder asked whether a sale is possible now or in six months (Terho et al., 2023); stated urgency may mean only collecting literature (Monat, 2011)	Interviews; literature review
MEDDIC: Metrics	What result does the buyer expect?	Buyers wanted costs justified in terms of benefits (Friend et al., 2014)	Buyer interviews, 35 failed cases
MEDDIC: Economic buyer	Who releases the money?	Salespeople found a sale very challenging where the buying centre lacked authority over the whole solution, as the authors report (Virtanen et al., 2015)	Interviews in one company, reported by the authors
MEDDIC: Decision criteria	What are options judged against?	Buyers named adaptability, relationship potential and cost (Friend et al., 2014)	Buyer interviews, 35 failed cases
MEDDIC: Decision process	How does the buyer reach a signature?	Collaborative deals were more often canceled than won; canceled covers no purchase decision, including the seller’s no-go (Virtanen et al., 2015)	One company’s CRM, 4,194 leads

Letter or rule	What the framework asks	Closest thing a study observed	Kind of evidence
MEDDIC: Identify pain	What problem makes acting worth it?	Qualifiers research the customer's pain points and needs (Terho et al., 2023)	Interviews, 13 people in 8 firms
MEDDIC: Champion	Who inside argues for the purchase?	Hard for salespeople to cancel an unimportant lead when only part of the buying centre was ready, an executive said, as the authors report (Virtanen et al., 2015)	Interviews in one company, reported by the authors
Rule: tight or loose	How strictly should leads be qualified?	A mailer drawing tight leads converted 30.8% of leads into sales against 7.7%, but produced 32 sales against 48 (Jolson, 1988)	Field test, one firm, six salespeople
Rule: scorecard, three of five parts BANT-like	Does it separate buyers from non-buyers?	Passed leads booked at 29%, rejected leads at 10%; 20 of 58 eventual bookings rejected, in the sample the cutoff was fitted to; this essay's arithmetic on Monat (2011)	One company, 324 leads

The first two columns are the frameworks' content. The third is the nearest observation in each study, matched to a letter by this essay. No study names BANT or MEDDIC; the last two rows judge a qualification rule as a whole against sales, each in one firm, and neither tests a checklist.

Source Author's mapping. Observations from Jolson (1988), pp. 191 and 194 to 196; Monat (2011), pp. 183 and 186 to 191, with Monat's own cutoff and the booking rates of passed and rejected leads computed by this essay from his Table VII; Terho et al. (2023), pp. 343 to 345; Virtanen et al. (2015), article in press, pp. 4 and 6 to 8; Friend et al. (2014), article in press, pp. 1, 4 and 7. The letter definitions are the frameworks' own content as commonly spelled out; no study names BANT or MEDDIC.

How tightly should a team qualify its leads?


§ 3 of 12

The one field experiment on qualification tightness in this essay's sources is Jolson (1988)[4]. Salespeople, he reports, call highly qualified leads tight and poorly qualified ones loose, "where tight leads are considered to be high probability prospects". In 1987 he was "hired as a consultant" to a regional security installer, disguised in the paper as Crime-Stoppers, and tested two mailers. The tight one carried a reply card asking for a call: "Please phone me to discuss a free demonstration and security analysis." The loose one offered a booklet. Each went to 20,000 small businesses, and "Bias was eliminated by interlacing the two types of mailers throughout the mailing list".

The returned leads went to "six relatively inexperienced salespeople", and "Two teams of three people each were formed (by a coin toss), with one team assigned to work loose leads and the other to work tight leads." Figure 3 shows the result by mid-December 1987. Tight leads converted far better: 32 sales from 104 leads, against 48 sales from 622. Loose leads produced more sales, more sales dollars ($95,320 from leads against $64,200) and a lower lead cost per sale ($200 against $300). In Jolson's[4] summary, "Tight leads produced a higher conversion rate into sales and an increased level of motivation for sales force members."

Figure 3 Tight and loose lead qualification in a 1988 field test

The mailer that drew tightly qualified leads converted at four times the rate of the loose one and still ended with fewer sales.




Tight leads turned 30.8 per cent of leads into sales, loose leads 7.7 per cent. The loose team still made 16 more sales and $31,120 more in sales from leads, at a lower lead cost per sale. Tightness was set by the mailer's offer, not by a checklist applied afterwards, and with three salespeople per team the teams cannot be separated from the leads.

Source Jolson (1988), p. 194, results table for mailers T and L, each sent to 20,000 small businesses on 1 September and 1 October 1987 and interlaced name by name, with results counted to 15 December 1987; conversion rates and sales values from Table 2, p. 195. One firm, six salespeople in two teams of three assigned by coin toss; no statistical test is reported.

Jolson gives two reasons a high conversion rate can mislead. In the test, the tight team ran short of work: “The T sales group seemed to run out of places to go and demonstrated little initiative and weak work habits in developing their own prospects.” And in a hypothetical he puts to sales meetings, he notes that salespeople prize the rate because “A higher conversion rate means more frequent reinforcement”, a preference that “does not confirm the correlation of the conversion rates of leads and presentations with selling effectiveness and efficiency”. On this essay’s reading, a checklist that rejects more leads raises the conversion rate as long as the leads it rejects convert less often than those it keeps; the question is what it does to sales. Figure 4 puts the two measures side by side.

Figure 4 Conversion rate against sales in tight and loose lead qualification, 1988

The mailer with the higher conversion rate brought in less money: in this test the two measures pointed opposite ways.



Each half has its own scale. Left: the share of returned leads that became sales. Right: dollars of sales from those leads. Tightness was set by the mailer's offer, not by a checklist, and one firm's test does not say how often the two measures diverge elsewhere.

Source Jolson (1988), Table 2, p. 195: sales per lead and sales from leads for mailers T and L, each sent to 20,000 small businesses on 1 September and 1 October 1987, results counted to 15 December 1987. One firm, six salespeople in two teams of three; no statistical test is reported.

The limits are large, and Jolson states the main one himself: “the current results are surely not generalizable”. It is one firm, six new salespeople and a sales contest, run by the company’s own consultant, with no statistical test. Tightness came from the mailer’s offer, not from a checklist, so on this essay’s reading the test shows the trade-off a stricter checklist makes rather than testing one. Jolson also puts the case for tight leads, as a question: should management not worry that “with such a high rate of rejection, the firm’s market will soon be satiated”? “From this point of view, a tight lead system is much more efficient.” The question, he adds, “will vary among firms and industries”: a seller of specialised equipment “may be limited to a relative handful of likely buyers”.

Does a scorecard with BANT-like items predict which leads close?

§ 4 of 12

Monat (2011)[5] reviewed the published lead-scoring models, several of which score need, timing, budget or authority, and concluded that “although there are several models purported to characterize sales leads, none has been validated”. In practice, he writes, “determining which characteristics are important is usually an educated guess based upon the sales manager’s personal experience, gut feel, and the sales literature he/she has recently read”. He warns that “a prospect expressing great time urgency may in fact only be urgently collecting literature”, and that which characteristics predict “varies from industry to industry and from company to company within industries”.


5 Monat, J. P. (2011). Industrial sales lead conversion modeling. Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 29(2), 178–194.

He then tested a scorecard on 324 leads drawn at random from one US computer hardware and software company’s records for 2003 to 2005. Its items include “Is the project funded?”, “Decision authority of the contact” and a timeframe. He could score “five of the eight customer purchase decision determinants” (need, urgency, ability to purchase, trust in the vendor and competition) and summed them with equal weights. On this essay’s reading three are close to BANT’s letters, and the lead’s source and who contacted whom also count towards need and urgency. Monat reports only the summed score, so what follows belongs to the whole scorecard, not to its BANT-like items. “Of the 324 leads analyzed, 58 (17.9 percent) eventually converted to bookings while 266 did not.”

On this essay’s arithmetic from Monat’s[5] Table VII, the scorecard placed 38 of the 58 bookings and 171 of the 266 others on the right side of its cutoff. The leads it would have passed booked at 29 per cent (38 of 133), against 18 per cent for all leads and 10 per cent (20 of 191) for those it would have rejected, and it would have rejected 20 of the 58 leads that became bookings, about one in three. That is the trade-off in one company’s numbers, and an optimistic version of it: the cutoff was found “By experimentation” on the same leads, the study “did not use hold-out samples for validation”, “no tests of statistical significance were performed”, and “a single analyst scrutinized the archived e-mails”, with no second coder reported. Figure 5 shows how the cutoff split each group.

Figure 5 What a lead scorecard cutoff passed and rejected, in sample

The cutoff passed two thirds of the leads that later booked and rejected one third, while passing about a third of the leads that never booked.



Shares of each group by the scorecard's decision. Passed leads booked at 29 per cent (38 of 133), rejected leads at 10 per cent (20 of 191). The cutoff was fitted to these same leads, so the split is an optimistic estimate, and it belongs to the whole five-part score, not to its BANT-like items.

Source This essay's arithmetic on Monat (2011), Table VII, p. 191: 324 leads from one US computer hardware and software company, 2003 to 2005; 58 booked and 266 did not; 38 bookings and 171 non-bookings fell on the correct side of Monat's cutoff, which he found by experimentation on the same leads, scoring five equally weighted determinants, three of them close to BANT's letters on this essay's reading. No hold-out sample and no significance test.

Does the sales context decide which checklist fits?

§ 5 of 12

Terho et al. (2023)[7] studied sales development, the role that qualifies leads before field sales takes them on. “The authors adopted a qualitative field-study approach and interviewed 13 people from eight firms.” With warm inbound leads from single prospects, the checks interviewees described are close to BANT’s. One co-founder put the question as “We tried to find out if it’s a case where we can sell something right now or maybe six months down the line”, adding that “many leads that contact us are not the right persons from the perspective of sales”. Reading those remarks as timing and authority is this essay’s mapping.

7 Terho, H., Salonen, A., & Yrjänen, M. (2023). Toward a contextualized understanding of inside sales: The role of sales development in effective lead funnel management. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 38(2), 337–352.

Complex sales change the work. “Complex purchase decisions require prolonged engagement of multiple and varied customer stakeholders at the account level rather than at the individual prospect level”, and account-based sales development has to “map the key stakeholders in the customer’s decision-making unit”. That is MEDDIC’s ground, and the guide to buying committees covers how such a group is mapped. One inside sales lead put the practical point: “What a sales qualified lead looks like can be customized for the company”, “but always have qualification criteria”. The authors aim at “analytical rather than statistical generalizability”, so the study shows that qualification differs by context, not which criteria predict a sale.

Why do complex deals end without any decision?

§ 6 of 12

Virtanen et al. (2015)[8] studied the CRM records of one IT solutions company: “The final dataset contains 4194 sales leads, and each lead is nested under a certain customer.” They kept won, lost to a competitor and canceled apart, where canceled “leads are those of which have been stopped because the customer made no purchasing decision”, and they add that “The reason might be a no-go decision from the suppliers’ side, or that the customer has expressed unwillingness to proceed further with that particular opportunity.” The win-loss essay argues for keeping the three outcomes separate. For qualification the point is sharper: a checklist that predicts “not lost” can still fill a pipeline with deals that end canceled, by the buyer’s choice or the seller’s.

8 Virtanen, T., Parvinen, P., & Rollins, M. (2015). Complexity of sales situation and sales lead performance: An empirical study in business-to-business company. Industrial Marketing Management, 45, 49–58. Article in Press, corrected proof, published online 2015.

The authors sorted leads by relational complexity, a category salespeople recorded in the CRM. Against leads in value-adding relationships, leads in the most collaborative relationships were more likely to end canceled than won (the relative log odds rose by 0.827) and lost than won (by 0.398). Leads at the other end, where “the customer has already predefined the need and is looking for the lowest price”, were also more likely to be lost or canceled than the middle group. The category joins a defined need to a lowest-price search, so it

cannot show what a yes to BANT's third letter is worth on its own. On this essay's reading, a buyer who arrived with the need already specified and shopped on price was not the best lead in that company.

The interviews, as the authors report them, describe what MEDDIC's letters try to catch. Salespeople, they write, found a sale "very challenging when the customer's buying center does not have the authority to decide from all the aspects of the solution", and they paraphrase a C-level executive: "it would be hard for the salespeople to cancel a lead that is not important, if only a part of the customer's buying center is ready to develop the idea further". In MEDDIC's terms, that is a champion without the economic buyer; the study used neither term. The authors recommend "that companies should emphasize more on how canceled leads are reported and analyzed", and note that "the salesperson reported CRM data itself is not as accurate as, for example, financial data".

Who has to believe the checklist for it to work?

§ 7 of 12

Every checklist ends in someone's judgment. Jolson put it bluntly: "A lead is highly qualified only if the salesperson thinks it is." D'Haen and Van den Poel (2013)[1] describe the same step in a prospecting model: "This qualification is often driven by gut feeling or self-claimed competence." Sabnis et al. (2013)[6], surveying 461 reps in four B2B firms, start from the premise that "Sales reps cannot observe the objective quality of leads; they are motivated by their perceptions of lead quality". Reps who rated marketing's screen higher gave marketing leads a larger share of their time: "a 1% increase in perceived prequalification quality produces a 1.12% increase in marketing lead follow-up time allocation".

1 D'Haen, J., & Van den Poel, D. (2013). Model-supported business-to-business prospect prediction based on an iterative customer acquisition framework. Industrial Marketing Management, 42(4), 544–551.

6 Sabnis, G., Chatterjee, S. C., Grewal, R., & Lilien, G. L. (2013). The sales lead black hole: On sales reps' follow-up of marketing leads. Journal of Marketing, 77(1), 52–67.

The data are one survey, which leaves out 39 reps who reported no time on marketing leads, 37 of them from one firm, who rated the screen lower than the rest. This essay reads the result as an association, and the rating "is not an objective, firm-level measure". On this essay's reading, a BANT or MEDDIC tick that reps do not trust changes little about where their time goes. Sabnis et al.[6] also record the other side of a screen. Citing a practitioner report from 2006, they

write that “disagreements about classifying leads can cause sales reps to discard customers that would be highly likely to buy in the future”. The lead scoring guide charts the survey’s firm-by-firm figures.

Does walking away from weak deals early pay off?

§ 8 of 12

Friend et al. (2019)[3] define failing fast as “the salesperson’s decision to stop pursuing a prospect early in the sales cycle if s/he estimates the prospect will not eventually purchase”. In their main study, 297 US business-to-business salespeople completed a survey. The authors expected failing fast to go with higher sales performance, but “it was not supported as the relationship was non-significant” ($\beta = 0.01$). Customer orientation strengthened the link ($\beta = 0.15$), and role autonomy weakened it ($\beta = -0.18$).

3 Friend, S. B., Ranjan, K. R., & Johnson, J. S. (2019). Fail fast, sell well: The contingent impact of failing fast on salesperson performance. Industrial Marketing Management, 82, 265–275. Article in Press, corrected proof, published online 2019.

Their conclusion is a contingency: “Sales managers must be cognizant that failing fast is neither universally good nor bad.” Performance was each salesperson’s rating against peers, and the authors note that “self-report measures of performance may possess an upward bias”. They also name what a seller’s record cannot show: “a buyer can help shed light on whether the salesperson’s enactment of failing fast was appropriate or if the salesperson incorrectly exited early”. A rejected lead gets no follow-up, so it never produces the outcome that would show the rejection was wrong.

What did buyers say about budget when a proposal failed?

§ 9 of 12

BANT’s first letter asks whether money exists. Friend et al. (2014)[2] asked buyers why proposals had failed: “Thirty-five semi-structured interview cases were conducted with buying decision makers following failed key account sales proposals.” By design every case was a proposal above $5 million that the buyer awarded to another seller, so “the sale was not lost as a result of a discontinued budget or service requirement”. Cost was one of three drivers they found, beside adaptability and relationship potential, and the authors sum up the point buyers pressed: “Costs associated with the service proposal need to be justified in terms of benefits.” In one case the buyer reported, “We awarded to the lowest price bidder.”

2 Friend, S. B., Curasi, C. F., Boles, J. S., & Bellenger, D. N. (2014). Why are you really losing sales opportunities? A buyers' perspective on the determinants of key account sales failures. Industrial Marketing Management, 43(7), 1124–1135. Article in Press, corrected proof, published online 2014.

On this essay's reading, among these funded deals a budget tick could not have separated the lost proposal from the winning one; what the buyers judged is closer to MEDDIC's metrics, the result expected for the cost. Because deals lost for lack of budget were left out, the study says nothing about what a budget check catches. The two sellers were US Fortune 250 industrial service organizations, only failures were studied, and the authors warn that buyer respondents "may present survivor biases".

What can neither BANT nor MEDDIC tell a revenue team?

§ 10 of 12

On this essay's reading of the studies, three things stay out of reach of either checklist:


1. **Whether its letters predict a win in your market.** The two outcome tests judge a rule as a whole, each in one firm, and neither tests a checklist; Monat's[5] ran in the sample its cutoff was fitted to.
2. **Whether the buyer would agree with the record.** A checklist is filled in by the seller, and Friend et al. (2014)[2] chose buyers as respondents because research resting on seller-side data "can introduce attribution biases".
3. **What the rejected leads would have done.** A lead that fails the screen gets no follow-up, so the CRM holds no outcome for it unless someone pursues it anyway.

How can a team test its own qualification rule?

§ 11 of 12

Figure 6 draws the answer above as a flow: a team chooses one screen by who decides, and each screen rejects leads that leave the flow before any outcome is written down, unless a sample of them is pursued. The flow is this essay's framing; the three outcomes follow Virtanen et al.[8], including cancellations by the seller.

Figure 6 How can a team test its own qualification rule?



Source Diagram from this essay. Sources and interpretation are given in the article.

The test below is the author's proposal and has not been run. It borrows Jolson's[4] design and Monat's[5] method, and adds what each study lacked (Figure 7):

1. **Stamp each letter when it is answered**, not when the deal closes. A champion entered after the signature makes the champion look predictive.
2. **Keep won, lost and no decision apart**, judged on a fixed day, as Virtanen et al.[8] kept canceled leads apart from lost ones.
3. **Pursue a sample of rejected leads**, assigned alternately or by lot as Jolson split his mailing list, so that the cost of the rule's tightness becomes visible.
4. **Set the cutoff on one period and check it on the next**, the hold-out Monat's[5] test did not have.

5 **Compare and repeat:** win and no-decision rates for leads that passed each letter against those that failed it, and for the rejected sample against the passed leads, every quarter. D'Haen and Van[1] den Poel ask that "Information on decisions made, steps taken, strategies employed, and so on must be recorded and analyzed periodically."

Figure 7 A qualification rule test record for BANT or MEDDIC

Stamp each letter when it is answered, keep three outcomes, pursue a sample of rejected leads and check the cutoff on a later period.

Rule Which version and cutoff, set on which period?	Letters When was each recorded, at which stage?	Outcome Won, lost or no decision, by which day?	Rejected sample Which rejected leads were pursued, assigned how?	Comparison Win and no-decision rates, passed against rejected?	Next period Does the cutoff hold on later leads?

A qualification rule tested only on the leads it passed, or only on the leads it was fitted to, cannot show what its tightness costs.

One row per rule version. Without the rejected sample, a strict rule and a costly one look the same in the CRM.

Source Author's decision worksheet. The three outcomes follow Virtanen et al. (2015), article in press, pp. 4 and 9; the rejected sample follows the alternating assignment in Jolson (1988), p. 194, and the early-exit limit in Friend et al. (2019), article in press, p. 9; the hold-out answers the limit Monat (2011) states on p. 191; stamping each letter when it is answered is this essay's. The fields are reader inputs; no company data is supplied.

An illustration, with no company data: a software team qualifies inbound demo requests with BANT. For one quarter it stamps each letter as it is answered, judges every request on day 180 as won, lost or no decision, and passes every tenth rejected request to a seller. If the rejected sample wins nearly as often as the passed requests, the rule is not separating buyers from non-buyers in that market. If it wins less often, but often enough to pay for the follow-up, the rule is too tight. If passed requests end in no decision as often as rejected ones, the rule

is screening for something other than what decides the deal. Count the rejected wins before reading the rates, and pool quarters while the count is small. A team selling to buying groups would run the same test on MEDDIC's letters, at the stage where each is recorded.

So which framework should a team adopt?

§ 12 of 12

Choose by who decides and by how many buyers there are; that is this essay's reading, not a finding. Where one contact can buy within weeks and the market is wide, BANT's four questions are a reasonable screen, and Jolson's[4] test is a warning against making it so tight that sellers run out of leads. Where a buying group decides over months and the market is a few accounts, MEDDIC's letters point at what ended deals canceled in Virtanen et al.[8]'s company, and Jolson's consideration for tight qualification, a market small enough to run out, may apply. In both cases the checklist is a hypothesis about what predicts a sale in one market, and a stricter version can buy a higher conversion rate with sales it will never see. Only a team's own records, kept as Figure 7 asks, can show which one it is running.

End of essay

References

1 D'Haen, J., & Van den Poel, D. (2013). Model-supported business-to-business prospect prediction based on an iterative customer acquisition framework. Industrial Marketing Management, 42(4), 544–551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2013.03.006

2 Friend, S. B., Curasi, C. F., Boles, J. S., & Bellenger, D. N. (2014). Why are you really losing sales opportunities? A buyers' perspective on the determinants of key account sales failures. Industrial Marketing Management, 43(7), 1124–1135. Article in Press, corrected proof, published online 2014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.06.002

3 Friend, S. B., Ranjan, K. R., & Johnson, J. S. (2019). Fail fast, sell well: The contingent impact of failing fast on salesperson performance. Industrial Marketing Management, 82, 265–275. Article in Press, corrected proof, published online 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.01.007

4 Jolson, M. A. (1988). Qualifying sales leads: The tight and loose approaches. Industrial Marketing Management, 17(3), 189–196. https://doi.org/10.1016/0019-8501(88)90002-8

5 Monat, J. P. (2011). Industrial sales lead conversion modeling. Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 29(2), 178–194. https://doi.org/10.1108/02634501111117610

6 Sabnis, G., Chatterjee, S. C., Grewal, R., & Lilien, G. L. (2013). The sales lead black hole: On sales reps' follow-up of marketing leads. Journal of Marketing, 77(1), 52–67. https://doi.org/10.1509/jm.10.0047

7 Terho, H., Salonen, A., & Yrjänen, M. (2023). Toward a contextualized understanding of inside sales: The role of sales development in effective lead funnel management. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 38(2), 337–352. https://doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-12-2021-0596

8 Virtanen, T., Parvinen, P., & Rollins, M. (2015). Complexity of sales situation and sales lead performance: An empirical study in business-to-business company. Industrial Marketing Management, 45, 49–58. Article in Press, corrected proof, published online 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.02.024

How to cite this essay

Isoglu, S. (2026, October 30). BANT vs MEDDIC: a qualification checklist is a hypothesis. Sinan Isoglu. https://isoglu.com/insights/journal/bant-vs-meddic/
Online version: https://isoglu.com/insights/journal/bant-vs-meddic/

Sinan Isoglu, MBA (Quantic)

Commercial growth leader, lecturer and doctoral researcher
© 2026 Sinan Isoglu · isoglu.com · All rights reserved